Northern Illinois University

Huskie Commons
Honors Capstones

Undergraduate Research & Artistry

12-5-2021

The Storm Is on Us: Communities and Military Mobilization in Civil
War Chicago
Jeremy R. Knoll

Follow this and additional works at: https://huskiecommons.lib.niu.edu/studentengagementhonorscapstones

Recommended Citation
Knoll, Jeremy R., "The Storm Is on Us: Communities and Military Mobilization in Civil War Chicago" (2021).
Honors Capstones. 2.
https://huskiecommons.lib.niu.edu/studentengagement-honorscapstones/2

This Dissertation/Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Undergraduate Research & Artistry at
Huskie Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Honors Capstones by an authorized administrator of
Huskie Commons. For more information, please contact jschumacher@niu.edu.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY
“The Storm Is on Us”: Communities and Military Mobilization in Civil War
Chicago
A Capstone Submitted to the
University Honors Program
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements of the Baccalaureate Degree
With Honors
Department Of
History
By
Jeremy Knoll
DeKalb, Illinois
May 2022

Abstract
This research project uses primary sources such as regimental histories, records kept by
the Adjutant General of Illinois, reporting from the Chicago Tribune, and the published and
unpublished memoirs, diaries, and letters of both soldiers and civilians to examine the role
communities played in military mobilization in Chicago during the Civil War. An urban
environment like Chicago had many such communities, including religious denominations,
professional and commercial organizations, militia units, immigrant communities, and political
organizations. These communities strongly impacted the mobilization process in Chicago by
organizing and supporting certain units, and individual Chicagoans were influenced by their
community affiliations when deciding whether to enlist and in which units. In addition to
shedding light on how the Civil War was experienced in Chicago, this research has further
implications for future research on both military mobilization and Civil War soldiers'
motivations.
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Introduction
In the early morning hours of April 22, 1861, a middle-aged man carrying a doublebarreled shotgun strode across a wooden railroad bridge four miles north of Carbondale, Illinois.
It was evident that he had not meant to be roused at this hour: he was in his shirtsleeves, with his
suspenders dangling at his sides, and only the moonlight illuminated the brown waters of the Big
Muddy River rolling past below his feet.1 Judging from appearances, one would not be able to
guess that this man was Richard Kellogg Swift, a wealthy Chicago banker, and on this occasion,
the commanding general of the largest militia force in Illinois. Swift was accompanied on his
walk across the bridge by members of his staff, which included such dignitaries as the president
of the Illinois Central Railroad, a former Chicago alderman, and a number of prominent Chicago
merchants.2 Having reached the end of the bridge, General Swift and his staff returned to the
train that had brought them there, informing the wary engineers that the bridge had not been
sabotaged and was safe to cross. Given the secretive and important nature of their cargo, the
engineers’ paranoia was warranted. Their train carried four bronze cannons strapped to platform
cars and a motley force of about 400 militiamen and volunteers, armed with a variety of hunting
rifles, shotguns, and antique pistols.3 When the train had left Chicago the previous night, its
official destination had been the state capital of Springfield, but Governor Richard Yates had
secretly ordered Swift to instead occupy Cairo, a small town at the southern end of Illinois that
overlooked the vitally important confluence of the Ohio and Mississippi rivers. Within fortyeight hours of leaving Chicago, Swift’s Cairo Expedition had secured the town for the Union.4
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Although Swift’s unopposed occupation of Cairo would ultimately prove to be a minor
incident in the course of the Civil War, it is also indicative of Chicago’s participation in the war.
Chicago contributed heavily to Illinois’s outsized impact on the Civil War: notwithstanding
Illinois’s connections to Abraham Lincoln and Ulysses S. Grant, Illinois contributed 256,297
men to the Union forces.5 When compared to Illinois’s population from the 1860 census of
1,711,951, Illinois contributed the most men per capita of any Union state.6 In addition, the vast
majority of Illinois’s troops were volunteers, as the enthusiasm with which the state responded to
President Lincoln’s calls for troops meant that only 3,538 Illinoisans were drafted during the
war.7 Troop contributions within Illinois were measured at the county level, and Cook County
clearly played its part in supporting the Union, as its contribution of 22,436 men made up 8.8
percent of Illinois’s total from a county representing 8.4 percent of the state population.8 Of
course, numbers alone do not tell the full story. The Cairo Expedition saw the involvement of
wealthy Chicago businessmen, antebellum militia units, German and Hungarian immigrant
groups, and Chicagoans who had swiftly volunteered for military service.9 It is this complex
mixture of organizations and communities from within Chicago’s population, not just the scale
of Chicago’s response to the war, that makes Chicago’s early-war experiences with mobilization
especially worthy of historical study.
Despite the importance of military mobilization to the Civil War, the amount of research
done on this topic in recent years has been limited. This is not to say that mobilization has not
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been recognized as significant. In a recent monograph, A Savage War: A Military History of the
Civil War, Williamson Murray and Wayne Wei-siang Hsieh assert that the Union’s combination
of “industrial power with the mobilization of manpower” not only enabled them to win the war
but also represented a great “military-social revolution” that foreshadowed the mobilization to
take place in World War I.10 The first two academic works to focus specifically on Civil War
mobilization were A. Howard Meneely’s The War Department, 1861 and Fred A. Shannon’s
Pulitzer Prize-winning The Organization and Administration of the Union Army, 1861-1865,
both released in 1928.11 These were rather straightforward works that used governmental and
military records in order to examine mobilization at the national level, although Meneely in
particular had a significant focus on exposing what he saw as Secretary of War Simon
Cameron’s failures early in the war. This presents a contrast with the only twenty-first century
monograph to examine Civil War mobilization, Mark Wilson’s economic history The Business of
Civil War. Wilson breaks from earlier historiography on mobilization by examining how
mobilization processes led to a massive and lasting expansion of the federal government and by
noting the effectiveness with which professional officers and quartermasters within the War
Department responded to the crisis.12 However, while Wilson’s work is significant in
understanding mobilization and logistical processes at the national level, such large-scale studies
are simply too broad to examine the impact of mobilization at the local and state levels.
In comparison, the study of mobilization at the local or community level has seen
increased attention in recent years. These works can be distinguished by their focus on a
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particular city or county, as well as their usage of sources such as regimental histories, census
data, local newspapers, and diaries or memoirs of common soldiers and civilians. Rather than
studying the nuances of logistics or how the state and federal governments developed
mobilization, these works use a “community-level analysis” that is better able to determine how
the mobilization process took place at the local level.13 These studies are therefore capable of
studying aspects of mobilization that are otherwise neglected in large-scale studies, such as unit
formation and the factors that impacted mobilization in these communities. One such study of
mobilization in Dubuque, Iowa, attempts to use the example of Dubuque to investigate whether
the Civil War was a “rich man’s war” but a “poor man’s fight,” and partially supports this
characterization by showing that soldiers with lower property values were more likely to be
enticed to serve by enlistment bounties.14 Another study, this one focused on Franklin County,
Pennsylvania, similarly uses census data to assert that volunteers under the age of eighteen
increasingly came from lower-income families as the war progressed.15 This study additionally
suggests that youths were more likely to enlist in majority-Republican areas early in the war, as
Republicans were the most supportive of the war effort.16 While these works represent only a
portion of the studies of community-level mobilization now in existence, they are representative
of the fact that focusing on mobilization at the local level allows for the incorporation of factors
such as class status and political affiliation.
Despite the increased interest in research on mobilization at the local level, this research
to date has only focused on rural areas or small towns. Mobilization can be regarded as a simpler
Russell L. Johnson, “‘Volunteer While You May’: Manpower Mobilization in Dubuque, Iowa,” in Union Soldiers
and the Northern Home Front: Wartime Experiences, Postwar Adjustments, ed. Paul Cimbala and Randall Miller
(New York: Fordham University Press, 2002), 33.
14
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15
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Magazine of History and Biography 135, no. 4 (2011): 433.
16
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task in these locales, as young men from small towns often banded together as a company or a
part of a company. This was the case with some communities in Cook County, as well. In
Lemont, sixty-four of the village’s 400 inhabitants formed the “Lemont Guards,” and in Blue
Island, a war meeting resulted in the creation of a company that later joined the 13th Illinois.17
Mobilization in an urban area like Chicago, whose 1860 population of 109,260 made it
the ninth-largest city in the nation, would by necessity have taken a different course than what
occurred in rural areas.18 While rural towns were comprised mainly of farmers, urban dwellers
were employed in a greater variety of professions and in greater numbers, including lawyers,
railroad workers, bankers, clerks, machinists, merchants, and meatpackers. Immigrants also
made up a greater portion of the population in cities, and Chicago was no exception. The 1860
census indicates that 54,624 Chicagoans were foreign-born, with the greatest representation
being found among German (22,230) and Irish (19,889) immigrants.19 Based on these
differences in demographics, it is reasonable to assume that residents of urban areas responded to
mobilization in a distinct manner from those living in rural areas, and a study of mobilization in
Chicago can therefore reveal what factors influenced the mobilization process in both that city
and urban areas in general.
This research is based upon a wide variety of sources pertaining to Chicago during the
Civil War, including regimental histories, records kept by the Adjutant General of Illinois,
reporting from the Chicago Tribune, and the published and unpublished memoirs, diaries,
journals, and letters of soldiers and community leaders. When taken in sum, these sources

“The Uprising,” Chicago Tribune, April 26, 1861; Military History and Reminiscences of the Thirteenth Regiment
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indicate that the most important factor influencing the mobilization process in Chicago was the
active engagement of organizations and communities that embraced the Union war effort and the
mobilization of military units. These include preexisting militia units, religious congregations,
political parties, immigrant communities, and commercial organizations or professions. The
urban landscape of Chicago presented a massive population that could be mobilized against the
Confederacy, and Chicagoans turned to the organizations with which they had already been
involved to assist in organizing mobilization and civilian support for the war effort. Just as these
groups influenced what units were created during the mobilization process, their presence also
played a role in individuals’ thinking when deciding whether to enlist and in which units. It can
therefore be said that the communities present in Chicago exercised a profound impact upon both
the city’s mobilization as a whole and how this mobilization was experienced by individual
Chicagoans.
In order to examine the role played by Chicago communities in influencing the
mobilization process, this essay will investigate five distinct categories of communities. The first
section will consider the militia units that existed in Chicago before the Civil War, as some units
had been founded years before the war, while others were created in response to the increase in
sectional tensions between North and South. The essay will then examine religious
denominations and church bodies, as individuals from these communities sometimes enlisted in
units alongside one another and even elected their religious leaders as officers. The third section
investigates the role political affiliation and political organizations played in the creation of units
and the selection of officers. The essay will then assess the various immigrant communities in
Chicago, as a wide variety of the city’s immigrants banded together to form their own military
units. A final section will explore the commercial organizations and occupational groups that

7
powered Chicago’s economy and answered the call to war by either sponsoring units or forming
their own. Although Chicago’s communities did not always influence the mobilization process in
the same ways, all of the groups included in these five categories were instrumental in shaping
the city’s early contributions to the war.

1. Militia Units
Although several different militia organizations existed within Chicago in the antebellum
period, an examination of these groups reveals that they were not well prepared for active
military service. In the years leading up to the war, the decreasing likelihood of attacks from
foreign powers or Native Americans meant that militias in Chicago and throughout the nation
were not treated as having actual military importance.20 Instead, American militia companies
increasingly became “highly selective social clubs” in which prominent members of the
community had the opportunity to dress in uniform and display their patriotism to the public.21
Such was the case in Chicago as well: after Richard K. Swift initiated the organization of the
Chicago Hussars and Light Artillery in 1847, the unit’s first action was to parade through the
city.22 The social nature of other Chicago militia units can be clearly seen in the advertisements
they placed in the local papers, as the Chicago Light Guard announced that they would be
organizing “cotillion parties” throughout the winter season in 1857, and the Chicago Dragoons
later hosted a “grand Soiree” in 1859.23 Militia units that regularly presented themselves to the
public naturally wished to do so in an impressive manner, and the Highland Guards consequently
Ricardo A. Herrera, “Self-Governance and the American Citizen as Soldier, 1775-1861,” The Journal of Military
History 65, no. 1 (2001): 25.
21
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23
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March 25, 1859.
20
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outfitted themselves with kilts, broadswords, and ostrich-feathered caps, prompting the Chicago
Tribune to describe them as the “most showy and attractive company in the city.”24 It is clear that
while a number of militia units coexisted in the city before the Civil War, these organizations
were far more qualified to host a social gathering than they were to put down a rebellion.
In contrast to the militia units that seemed to prioritize socialization over military
preparedness, Elmer Ellsworth’s United States Zouave Cadets stand out for both their
commitment to military drill and their national impact. Ellsworth modeled the Cadets after the
North African “zouaves” employed by the French Army, and the Cadets wore “bright,
picturesque uniforms and baggy trousers” that helped attract recruits to the unit.25 Potential
Cadets were held to a high standard and had to agree to abstain from drinking, gambling,
entering “houses of ill-fame,” and playing billiards, the excitement of which would “naturally
lead to drinking.”26 Ellsworth also drilled his Cadets relentlessly, and after the Cadets had
prevailed in drill competitions against other Illinois militia units, Ellsworth published newspaper
advertisements throughout the country indicating that the Cadets would accept challenges from
any militia company in the United States or Canada.27 Ellsworth’s challenge prompted a national
tour that took him and his Zouaves throughout the nation, with the Cadets giving drill exhibitions
witnessed by tens of thousands of spectators.28 This tour elevated the Cadets to national
prominence and evidently had a significant impact on the Civil War: there were dozens of
Zouave units created in both the North and the South, and when the already-famous Ellsworth
was killed shortly after the war began, he was mourned as a martyr throughout the Union.29
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Although their gaudy uniforms would have fit amongst any of the other Chicago militia units, the
strict professionalism of the Cadets enabled them to influence the perceptions of militia units in
both Chicago and the nation.
Beyond the socially-oriented militias and the Cadets, Chicago could also boast of militia
units that had been created as a direct response to the widening sectional divisions between
North and South. The immigrant communities of Chicago were active in creating such units, as
prominent Hungarian community leader Julian Kune recalled that the election of Abraham
Lincoln prompted some immigrants to begin organizing and drilling new militia companies.30
This was the case with the Lincoln Rifles, which was composed of “Hungarians and Bohemians”
who supported the new administration.31 Another militia unit created during this period was the
Turner Union Cadets, composed of Germans who similarly supported Lincoln and the Union.32
This latter group was associated with the Chicago Turnverein, a social and gymnastics club for
German immigrants, and seems to have been a new incarnation of the Rifle Company the
Turnverein had created during the prewar years.33 These newer militia units ultimately joined
together with older units such as the Highland Guards to form the Washington Independent
Regiment, which was at that time the largest militia unit in Chicago.34 As with the other militia
units, the men who comprised these newer organizations were enthusiastic volunteers rather than
trained soldiers, but the circumstances of their creation and their evident ideological motivations
indicate that they were willing to fight for the Union if and when they were called upon to take
up arms.
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Although Chicago’s militia forces made up only a small fraction of the forces Chicago
contributed to the Union, they played an instrumental role in creating new units and attracting
volunteers to these units. The Chicago Light Artillery, two companies of Chicago Zouaves, the
Turner Union Cadets, and the Lincoln Rifles were fully organized in time to participate in the
aforementioned Cairo Expedition, and upon their return, they sought to fill out their ranks in
order to create full batteries and regiments.35 This proved to be an easy task, given the existing
reputation of these units and the added esteem gained from newspaper coverage of the
Expedition. The Chicago Light Artillery proved themselves to be “a ready nucleus for forming a
first-class battery,” and less than twenty-four hours after they began enlisting recruits, Battery A
of the 1st Illinois Light Artillery was full.36 In fact, there were more volunteers than Battery A
was able to accept, and former Chicago Light Artillery members were able to fill Battery B in
June of 1861.37 Former militia units similarly lent a certain prestige to infantry regiments, which
helped to ensure that these regiments were quickly filled. After the Highland Guards became a
part of the 12th Illinois, this regiment became known as the “First Scotch Regiment,” and
multiple extant photographs indicate that soldiers of the regiment wore tam o’ shanters, a kind of
cap traditionally associated with Scotland.38 The inclusion of the two companies of Chicago
Zouaves in the 19th Illinois had a similar effect upon that regiment.39 The men of the 19th were
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clearly proud of their association with the famous Zouaves, as they established a regimental
newspaper called the Zouave Gazette and founded a “Zouave Glee Club” in their winter
quarters.40 Just as men were eager to join militia units before the war, volunteers also flocked to
the volunteers units associated with these organizations.
In addition to attracting new recruits to their units, it is clear that former members of the
militia felt strong social and peer pressure to join these new volunteer units. This can be seen in
the example of Patrick H. White, a former member of the Chicago Light Artillery who left
behind an unpublished diary that can be used to gauge his motivations for enlisting. When the
Light Artillery left for Cairo, White did not join them, as his mother had recently died, and his
sister feared that White’s departure would “leave the younger portion of our family scattered.”41
This was a common dilemma for men facing the decision to enlist, as although they felt called to
support their country, their manhood was also based upon their “responsibilities as husbands,
fathers, and breadwinners” for their families.42 While he initially honored this obligation, he
clearly felt ashamed about not having joined his former comrades, noting that he kept to the back
streets to avoid being seen.43 The tipping point for him came when he heard a young woman
ridiculing the men who had served in the militias but “hid their uniforms and themselves too”
once the war had begun. White “could stand it no longer” and soon visited his former armory to
assist in drilling new recruits, leading to his being commissioned as a second lieutenant in
Battery B of the 1st Illinois Light Artillery. The social pressure that White felt to enlist aligns
closely with James McPherson’s assertion that many Civil War soldiers enlisted in order to
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protect their honor, defined as “one’s public reputation” and “one’s image in the eyes of his
peers.”44 In the case of former militia members, men who were willing to parade with the militias
but unwilling to fight risked being seen by their peers as lacking honor, and men like Patrick
often chose to enlist rather than risk being seen as dishonorable.
As Chicagoans rushed to join the new volunteer military units being created, they also
often turned to men who had been in militias to fill officer positions in these units. The former
members of Ellsworth’s Zouaves were particularly successful in this regard. Of the fifty Cadets
who participated in the national tour, eleven became officers in Illinois volunteer infantry
regiments, including three colonels and four captains.45 These opportunities were not limited to
former Zouaves, as John McArthur, the prewar commander of the Highland Guards, was elected
as colonel of the 12th Illinois and eventually brevetted as a major general.46 A similar situation
occurred in the 24th Illinois, which elected Geza Mihalotzy as lieutenant colonel after
Mihalotzy’s Lincoln Rifles had joined the regiment.47 Furthermore, Chicago militia officers
proved themselves able to secure officer positions in regiments mainly composed of men from
other parts of the state, as John B. Wyman of the Chicago Light Guard was elected colonel of the
13th Illinois despite the fact only one of the regiment’s ten companies was from Cook County.48
Evidently, even those men from the militia units that were primarily social in nature had enough
credibility from their militia experiences for new recruits to turn to them as leaders during the
mobilization process.

44

McPherson, For Cause and Comrades, 23.
Ingraham, Elmer E. Ellsworth and the Zouaves of ’61, 66; “Illinois Civil War Muster and Descriptive Rolls,”
Office of the Illinois Secretary of State, https://apps.ilsos.gov/isaveterans/civilmustersrch.jsp.
46
Wardner, “Reminisces of a Surgeon,” 174.
47
Kune, Reminiscences of an Octogenarian Hungarian Exile, 101.
48
Military History and Reminiscences of the Thirteenth Regiment, 6.
45

13
2. Religious Denominations and Communities
At the beginning of the Civil War, Chicago had a relatively diverse religious makeup,
with a number of denominations represented among its citizens. Christianity was dominant, with
Baptist, Methodist, Unitarian, Catholic, Lutheran, and Episcopalian churches being built
throughout the city in the first half of the nineteenth century.49 Judaism was also represented, as
the city’s first synagogue was established in 1851. This religious diversity was certainly helped
by Chicago’s immigrant population, as the Irish and some Germans patronized Catholic
churches, and many Germans were Lutherans. It is natural for religious individuals to turn
toward their religion in times of trouble, and during the Civil War, many Chicagoans relied upon
their religious communities as they coalesced into new military units.
During the course of unit formation, men of the same religion or religious denomination
gravitated toward one another due to a natural desire to group themselves with individuals who
shared their religious beliefs. This could sometimes be for reasons of familiarity, as men who
enlisted in the all-Jewish company in the 82nd Illinois would have had more in common with
their fellow soldiers than if they had enlisted in a non-Jewish unit.50 A desire for commonality is
also why the majority-Catholic 90th Illinois made it clear that their colonel should be “of the
Catholic faith,” although they did accept a Protestant lieutenant colonel.51 Recruits did not have
to be in the same denomination as their fellow soldiers to find them religiously similar, either, as
shared devotion to Christianity also brought men together. One young man found that while his
father was already willing to give a “reluctant consent” to his decision to enlist, he also urged his
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son to join a company that he heard had been recruited by a minister and was made up of
“Christian young men.”52 William Cross Hazelton, the devout son of a preacher, similarly helped
to assuage his future wife’s worries about his decision to enlist by assuring her that the company
that he selected was composed of men “nearly all of excellent moral character” and commanded
by “a fine Christian man.”53 The Chicago Dragoons as a unit seemed to have prided themselves
on their religious devotion, as they amassed a “choicely selected Religious Library of 200
volumes,” attended church together, and had their uniforms designed with special pockets to
hold a Bible over their hearts.54 Whether they were formed due to the preferences of the recruits
or in order to help ease family’s concerns about their loved ones’ departure, units composed of
those with similar religious beliefs proved appealing to the men who shared these beliefs.
In addition to religious units being formed because of their appeal to potential recruits,
religious leaders sometimes aided the formation of these units by encouraging their fellow
believers to join specific units. A historian of the 90th Illinois, also known as the Irish Legion,
later noted that the unit’s organization was largely due to the efforts of the “Catholic Vicar
General of the Diocese of Chicago” in urging Irish Catholics to enlist in that unit.55 In general,
however, religious leaders more often raised companies than regiments. One such company was
raised by the appropriately-named Reverend William Slaughter, who appealed to his own
Methodist congregation but was also willing to accept any volunteers who shared his “piety,
patriotism, and resolution.”56 This company became a part of the 39th Illinois and was known as
the “Preacher’s Company,” both because of Slaughter’s involvement and the fact that “its rank
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and file had pretensions to more morality” than the other men of the regiment, as evidenced by
their aversion to cursing on the march.57 The Jewish company of the 82nd Illinois in turn was
organized partly due to the efforts of Henry Greenebaum. Greenebaum was not a member of the
clergy, but he was still a prominent Jewish leader who had been the first president of Chicago’s
Hebrew Relief Association.58 Greenebaum reminded his audience at a war meeting that they had
received religious freedoms in America that had never been available to them in Europe, and that
they therefore must support the Union in order to repay the nation for these freedoms.59 Based on
the fact that all of these aforementioned units were successfully filled for service, religious
leaders were evidently able to persuade those that already trusted them to enlist in the military
units these leaders supported.
In addition to encouraging their followers to enlist, some religious leaders capitalized
upon their influence in order to become officers, although this was a rare occurrence. In the 39th
Illinois, Reverend Slaughter quickly became Captain Slaughter, as the Methodists he had
recruited for the company elected him as their commander.60 The 90th Illinois nearly had a
similar situation when Vicar General Dennis Dunne was offered the colonelcy by Governor
Yates, but Dunne declined it, as it was understood that the commander should be a “practical and
experienced military man.”61 However, there was another reason provided for why Dunne would
not serve as the regiment’s colonel; an officer position like this one was seen as “inconsistent
with his holy office.” This speaks to a larger trend of religious leadership being seen as
incompatible with military leadership roles. A former sergeant in the 13th Illinois who had been
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seen as “a candidate for the ministry” later wrote that some of his fellow soldiers “seemed to
imagine that the profession of religion, and especially candidacy for the ministry, would render
an individual very submissive” and thus unfit to be an officer.62 In the case of this individual, the
situation was resolved when he forcefully asserted his authority and thus earned his comrades’
respect. While some clergymen like Reverend Slaughter were able to transition into military
leadership, the idea that religious leaders were not suited for the military seems to have limited
the occurrences of such a transition.

3. Political Parties and Organizations
As the nation moved toward the 1860 presidential election, two of the major candidates
in the race had personal connections to Chicago. Abraham Lincoln was nominated at the
Republican National Convention and owed his candidacy to the fact that the convention was held
in Chicago, where he enjoyed raucous support from Illinois Republicans.63 Representing the
Northern Democrats was Stephen A. Douglas, a Chicago resident who was hugely popular with
the city’s Democrats. After months of hard campaigning, Lincoln won Chicago’s vote in the
1860 election, carrying the city with 10,697 votes to Douglas’s 8,094 votes.64 However, while
the mayoral election in 1861 went to the Republicans, the Democrats were eventually able to
retake the city, with Francis C. Sherman winning election in 1862 and serving until the final days
of the war.65 With this fairly even representation, it is unsurprising that both Republicans and
Democrats would prove influential in Chicago’s mobilization.
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Although units were never monolithic in terms of political affiliation, there were
instances of men from one political party joining together during the mobilization process. The
Republicans benefited in this regard due to the existence of the Wide Awakes, societies of young
men who supported the Lincoln campaign. The Wide Awakes were created with the intent of
being able to respond to a sectional crisis like the Civil War, with one advertisement in January
of 1861 informing the North Side’s Wide Awakes that “it may not be long before we are called
upon to protect the dearest rights of our country.”66 The West Side Wide Awakes accordingly
voted unanimously to disband themselves within a week of the Battle of Fort Sumter in order to
allow their members to fight for the Union.67 Another group of Wide Awakes formed Company
B of the Chicago Zouaves, participated in the Cairo Expedition, and eventually became a
company in the 19th Illinois.68
The Wide Awakes’ Democratic counterparts, the Douglas Invincibles, seem to have not
involved themselves in mobilization. Stephen Douglas’s supporters did however help in the
creation of new military units, as “ardent war-democrat” and Chicago lawyer David Stuart’s
christening of the two regiments he raised as the Douglas Brigade surely appealed to like-minded
Democrats.69 While the new volunteer units being formed in 1861 would not have turned down
recruits with whom they had political disagreements, it does appear that units found success in
recruiting groups of men who had already been bound together by their support for a common
presidential candidate.
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Political affiliation also proved to be an important factor in determining which men
became officers, but was more significant in regiments where officers were appointed rather than
elected. One would certainly expect that politics would factor into officer elections, which were a
common occurrence during the beginnings of mobilization. Officer elections during the Civil
War allowed citizen-soldiers to engage in the democratic processes they felt they were owed, and
these elections were frequently connected to politics in the prewar militias, as potential officers
often had aspirations for some political office.70 However, while the regimental histories of the
Chicago volunteer units contain numerous examples of officer elections, political affiliation is
rarely addressed as a factor in these elections. In the case of the 37th Illinois, the regiment was
organized by a Republican politician named Julius White, who named the regiment the “Fremont
Rifles” in reference to the Republican Party’s first presidential candidate.71 Despite White’s
Republicanism, there is no mention of politics as a factor in his election as colonel, with the
regimental historian noting only that it was a “foregone conclusion” that White would be the
regiment’s colonel due to his efforts to organize the regiment and advertise on its behalf.72
Politics did play a role in officer selections, as Governor Yates removed native Virginian and
former Democratic elector Thomas Shirley from his position as colonel of the 12th Illinois due to
“strong suspicions” that Shirley supported the Confederacy.73 In contrast, Yates appointed
Democrat Francis T. Sherman as colonel of the 88th Illinois despite objections from within the
regiment.74 This seems to have been a savvy political move, as Sherman’s father was elected
mayor of Chicago that same year. Although politically-charged decisions regarding officers were
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infrequent, they appear to have been more common than officer elections being determined by
political affiliation.
While political influence only went so far in helping men to attain officer positions, some
potential officers drew upon political connections in order to try to secure their units’ acceptance
into the military. The men of the 39th Illinois were evidently eager to join the war effort, as
although the vast majority were from Illinois, they appealed to the Governor of Missouri to be
accepted as a regiment of that state once Illinois’s quota of troops had been filled.75 When that
failed, the regiment began calling themselves the “Yates Phalanx” and called upon Governor
Yates to petition the federal government on their behalf. Yates did so, sending “strong
commendatory letters to the President and Secretary of War,” but the 39th Illinois were
ultimately forced to wait until later in 1861 before they were accepted. Julian Kune of the 24th
Illinois, a prominent immigrant leader and member of Chicago’s pro-Republican Cameron and
Lincoln Club, experienced more success. As he had already been acquainted with Lincoln, Kune
proceeded to Washington, where he met first with Secretary of War Simon Cameron and then the
president. While Secretary Cameron informed Kune that he could not accept the regiment, Kune
eventually managed to secure a meeting with Lincoln and persuaded the president to order that
the unit be accepted.76 The negotiations and pleading associated with securing the acceptance of
a regiment reflected the fact that Illinois received far more volunteers than they were able to
organize into regiments, with the federal government giving Illinois an initial quota of only 6,000
men.77 Under these circumstances, it is unsurprising that some men turned to political allies in
order to push for their units’ acceptance.
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4. Immigrant Communities
Given that immigrants were such a major facet of Chicago in the nineteenth century, it is
clear that any major action undertaken by the city would feature participation by immigrant
communities. The 1860 census indicated that 49.99 percent of Chicago’s population were
immigrants, a rate only surpassed by St. Louis and the smaller cities of Milwaukee and San
Francisco.78 The majority of these were Germans and Irish, but Chicago was also home to
thousands of recent immigrants from England and Scotland, as well as smaller groups from
France, the Scandinavian nations, and other parts of Europe. With such a massive portion of
Chicagoans belonging to immigrant communities, the city and its immigrants simply cannot be
separated, and immigrant communities proved themselves to be tremendously influential in
providing Chicago with both units and officer candidates during the mobilization process.
Units formed from within Chicago’s immigrant communities typically owed their
existence to these communities’ desire to express their patriotism by supporting the Union. This
is evidenced by the advertisements placed in the newspapers by immigrant leaders in the days
after the beginning of the war. In the Chicago Tribune on April 20, a reader could find both an
advertisement calling on Scandinavians to join together “in defence of the laws and honor of our
adopted country” and an advertisement from James Mulligan asking for Irishmen to “sustain the
Government of the United States in and through the present war.”79 These advertisements proved
successful, with the Scandinavians forming Battery G of the 2nd Illinois Light Artillery and
Mulligan raising the majority-Irish 23rd Illinois. For the Germans of Chicago, similar appeals
were made in the German-language Illinois Staats-Zeitung. An editorial in this paper declared
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that since Germans have enjoyed “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” in the United States,
they must be willing to “offer our money, our property, and even our life in the service of the
Union.”80 Calls for Germans to serve their adopted country also appeared in the Illinois StaatsZeitung in 1862, when the German 82nd Illinois was being organized. One member of the
Chicago Turnverein told his countrymen in an open letter that although they were facing a
“fearsome enemy,” they must join together “in the battle for the Republic and for freedom.”81
These varied appeals show that immigrant communities often tapped into the feelings of
patriotism that dominated the early war period when forming units composed of men from their
communities.
Beyond just showing their patriotism, however, immigrant communities also organized
military units in order to favorably represent their respective communities. While he was in
Washington to secure the acceptance of the 23rd Illinois, James Mulligan noted in his diary that
he believed the war presented “an opening for a splendid record for the Western Irishman.”82 In
the case of the other predominantly Irish unit, the 90th Illinois, its organizers were partially
motivated by “a desire to disprove the charge, sometimes made, that the Irish Catholic element
was disloyal.”83 For the Germans of the 82nd Illinois, their service was meant both to show that
they were “not inferior” to those Germans enlisted in the 24th Illinois, and to show “the Rebels
what German blows are.”84 Other immigrant communities besides the Irish and Germans
similarly sought to promote the reputation of their nationalities through mobilization. In a letter,
the organizer of the Lincoln Rifles asked that they be provided with “good arms,” as since they
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were the first Hungarian unit formed in the United States, they wished to “do honor to the
country of our birth.”85 The formation of these immigrant units evidently aggrieved those
immigrant communities that did not take a similar course of action, with one Englishman writing
in the Chicago Tribune that he was jealous to see “representatives of every nation but my own
forming companies, regiments and brigades.”86 Immigrant communities can therefore be seen as
competing with one another in order to promote their reputations, as if they were not represented
among the Union forces, this could cause others to view them as less loyal or patriotic than other
immigrant communities that had contributed men to the Union cause.
Aside from wishing to win plaudits for their communities, immigrants also formed units
with one another in hopes of attaining some future goal in their native lands. This motivation is
most well-known among the Irish, who desired independence from the British and felt that
military experience could aid them in securing an independent Ireland. One particularly vocal
group in this regard was the Fenians, Irish nationalists who established militias in the United
States in the years before the Civil War and were “willing to sacrifice their lives for an
independent Ireland.”87 The Fenians were well-represented among the leadership of the 23rd
Illinois, as James Mulligan and other officers of the 23rd had either served in Fenian militias or
been otherwise involved with the Fenian movement.88 As such, the “opening” Mulligan
discusses in his diary seemingly indicates Mulligan’s belief that “a real Irish Brigade” composed
of men with experience from fighting the Confederacy could one day help in the struggle for
Irish independence.89 Although this anticipation of future change in one’s homeland as a result of
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the Civil War is primarily associated with the Irish, there is evidence that certain Germans held a
similar wish. A report in the Illinois Staats-Zeitung warned the “German American freedom
fighter” that they must first focus on preserving the Union, as once this goal had been
accomplished, they could return to the German states “in order to wrest away the tyranny and
aristocracy there forever.”90 For some Irish and German Chicagoans serving alongside their
fellow immigrants, their fight for the Union would ideally be a stepping stone on the path to
greater freedom in their respective native countries.
Beyond ideological reasons, immigrants also sought to serve in majority-immigrant units
because it would keep them in contact with the languages and cultures they were already familiar
with in their communities. This was evidently seen as a boon for morale, as one soldier in the
82nd noted with pride that the men were “exclusively German” and that the unit’s “camaraderie
could not be better.”91 The draw of fighting and marching with men of the same nationality also
explains why immigrants from elsewhere in the state gravitated toward the units formed
primarily by Chicago’s immigrant communities, with a company of Irish immigrants from
Waukegan traveling to join the 23rd Illinois.92 A common language, rather than a common
nationality, could also prove as a unifier for men who came from relatively small immigrant
communities. This can be seen in an advertisement for the French Battalion, which noted that the
“French Canadians, Belgians and Swiss” would also be invited to join the new unit.93 Ultimately,
the 24th Illinois would include a Swiss company and a company created from the Hungarian
Lincoln Rifles, as these communities were simply too small to create regiments of their own.94
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The composition of these units indicates that immigrants preferred serving alongside men from
their nationality, those with whom they shared a fellow language, or even other immigrants from
a different nationality, and they accordingly enlisted in the units put forth by Chicago’s
immigrant communities.
In addition to creating volunteer military units, immigrant communities within Chicago
also proved influential in the mobilization process by providing men with European military
experience to serve as officers in the new units. Naturally, some of these officers commanded
majority-immigrant units. Geza Mihalotzy had previously served in the army of AustriaHungary, which surely bolstered his reputation while he first organized the Lincoln Rifles and
then became lieutenant colonel of the 24th Illinois.95 Another European veteran with ties to the
24th Illinois was Charles Knobelsdorf, a “retired soldier of the Schleswig-Holstein army” who
helped to organize the regiment.96 When Knobelsdorf was not elected lieutenant colonel as he
had expected, he left to form the 44th Illinois and in turn became the colonel of that regiment.97
However, European veterans also found themselves in officer positions in non-immigrant units.
For the position of lieutenant colonel, the 55th Illinois elected Oscar Malmborg, who could boast
of an education from the Swedish Military Academy and years of service in the Swedish army.98
Although the 55th’s regimental history noted that Malmborg was initially unpopular with the
men due to his temper and focus on drill, he “had some tactical knowledge, then a rare
acquirement,” and ultimately rose to become the regiment’s colonel.99 The 19th Illinois’s
Russian colonel, Ivan Turchin, followed a similar path: he was educated at the Imperial Military
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School in St. Petersburg, served in the “Czar’s Army” for a number of years, and eventually
immigrated to America.100 Men like Turchin and Knobelsdorf who had prior European military
experience evidently impressed recruits, as they were able to attain leading officer positions in
immigrant and non-immigrant units alike.

5. Commercial Organizations and Professions
The final category of communities includes those that were formed through the social
connections produced by commercial and economic interactions within Chicago. Some of these
communities were based upon actual organizations, such as the Chicago Board of Trade and the
Chicago Mercantile Association, which brought together businessmen and merchants to promote
their common interests. In contrast, while men of certain professions typically did not belong to
an organization created for their profession, the various trades and professions of the city were
clearly seen as communities by both those that belonged to them and outsiders. As such, the
involvement of commercial or economic communities in mobilization not only shows the impact
these groups had on the creation of new units, but also indicates that these groups functioned as
communities for their members and were treated as such.
As the mobilization process began, Chicago’s trade organizations provided crucial
fundraising and financial support for many of the units being raised in the city. A history of the
Chicago Board of Trade during this period notes that although the Board was committed to
avoiding “all participation in political, religious or social movements,” it ultimately decided that
supporting the Union was a matter of patriotism and not politics.101 The Board of Trade quickly
moved to put their financial backing to use in mobilization. At an early meeting, it was proposed
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that the Board contribute $500 to a fund being created to pay for military equipment and the
soldiers’ families, only for the proposal to be raised to $5,000 and “carried with a whirlwind of
applause.”102 The members of the Board of Trade also took it upon themselves to support the
organization of the 23rd Illinois, as they sent a petition to the city government asking that the city
provide funding such that the regiment could be equipped for service.103 The Chicago Mercantile
Association was similarly active in fundraising, and at times the Board of Trade and Mercantile
Association engaged in cooperative efforts. Providing equipment for Chicago’s units was still a
major concern in November of 1861, and the Board of Trade and Mercantile Association agreed
that a committee of men from the latter organization should proceed to Washington to “induce
the location of an Armory and Arsenal” in Chicago.104 Although the massive financial burden of
equipping the Union troops would primarily fall upon the federal government, the financial
backing of organizations like the Board of Trade and the Mercantile Association was surely
appreciated by those units that benefited from it.
These commercial organizations did not limit themselves to supporting existing units,
however, as they also utilized both their wealth and their reputations to raise units of their own in
1862. The Chicago Board of Trade first raised $15,000 in order to create the Chicago Board of
Trade Battery and then outdid themselves by raising a further $55,000, resulting in the creation
of the 72nd, 88th, and 113th Illinois regiments as the First, Second, and Third Board of Trade
Regiments.105 The Mercantile Association likewise engaged in fundraising in order to raise the
Chicago Mercantile Battery, but their funding did not stop upon its organization; one member of
the battery wrote to his mother that the Mercantile Association was creating a “special Sanitary
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Commission for the Battery” to ensure that “the men will be looked after and cared for to the
greatest possible extent.”106 The promise of such support from the Mercantile Association seems
to have been an inducement for men to enlist that otherwise may not have. This same member
declared that the members of the Battery were “the best class Chicago affords -- merchants,
bookkeepers, clerks, lawyers, etc.”107 Since these were also men that had not volunteered at the
war’s beginning, the prestige and wealth of the Mercantile Association evidently made the
Battery an attractive enough prospect for them to finally join the war effort. The creation of the
Board of Trade Battery was met with a similar enthusiasm: 180 men, more than were needed,
had signed the muster roll within two days, and men waiting to enlist were turned away once the
roster had filled.108 During the Civil War and in the preceding years, the Board of Trade and the
Mercantile Association were seen as affluent, distinguished organizations, and by giving both
their money and their names to new units, these organizations continued their existing support of
mobilization in an even more impactful manner.
While the organization of units by commercial organizations may be regarded as “topdown” unit creation, the involvement of individual professions in the mobilization process can be
seen as a “bottom-up” process, as men of the same profession joined together in order to either
form their own units or attach themselves to existing units. One such profession whose workers
engaged in mobilization was that of railroad workers. The Chicago Tribune remarked soon after
the war had begun that the “call of the country found no class of our young men more prompt
and ready, than the employees of our railroads,” as sixty men from the Galena and Chicago
Railway Company and thirty from the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy left their respective
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companies in order to enlist.109 This was repeated on a larger scale in 1862, when employees
from the Illinois Central Railroad, the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy, the Galena & Chicago, the
Pittsburgh, Fort Wayne & Chicago, and three other railroads formed the 89th Illinois, which was
to be known as the “Railroad Regiment.”110 However, the railroad employees were not alone in
this regard. The early days of the war also featured the formation of a Military Fire Brigade
composed of Chicago firefighters, seventy of whom enlisted at an early meeting to discuss such a
possibility.111 An advertisement in the Tribune two days later appealed to “members of the
Chicago Bar” to join “Company E,” which had already enlisted fifty lawyers.112 It appears that
this group would eventually join Company A of the 58th Illinois, which included a number of
Chicago lawyers and clerks in its ranks.113 The involvement of men of the same occupation in
organizing units was thus a repeat occurrence, and certainly not limited to a particular trade.
While men of some professions enlisted alongside one another for reasons of familiarity,
professions such as engineers and carpenters were specifically recruited for units to be used for
military engineering and construction projects. One such unit was the short-lived “Mechanics’
Fusiliers,” which was composed of carpenters and mechanics and was engaged in building
barracks at Camp Douglas in Chicago before they were eventually disbanded.114 Civil engineer
Arthur C. Ducat placed an advertisement in the paper in an attempt to organize a unit of
“Engineers, Sappers and Miners,” with a note that only “military and civil engineers and
mechanics” would be accepted.115 At the same time that Ducat was attempting to organize his
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unit, the Yates Phalanx was also in search of engineers, as the men of the unit wished to have “a
corps of sappers and miners” attached to the regiment.116 Of course, the creation of such units
was bound to result in disappointment for some enlistees. Abram J. Davids recruited his own unit
of sappers with the intention of joining “Bissell’s Engineer Regiment of the West,” only for the
men to instead become a regular company of the 59th Illinois.117 This was to be a common fate
for those who dreamed of joining prestigious units of mechanics or engineers. While such units
were advertised and organized with some frequency in the first months of the war, they were
simply not needed, and these units’ volunteers either declined to serve or settled for another unit.

Conclusion
Three days after the Civil War began with the firing on Fort Sumter, the Chicago Tribune
had this to say to the “Tories and lickspittles” in Chicago who supported secession: “You must
keep your venom sealed, or go down! There is a Republic! The gates of Janus are open; the
storm is on us.”118 The reference to the gates of the Temple of Janus, which were kept closed
when the Romans were at peace and opened when they went to war, makes it apparent that the
“storm” the editors of the Chicago Tribune were referring to was the imminent civil war. If the
Civil War was indeed a storm to be weathered, then the people of Chicago turned to their
communities in order to make it through this turbulent period. Men grouped themselves together
with those they knew from church, their coworkers, and fellow immigrants so that they would
not be going off to war with strangers. Community leaders such as clergymen, wealthy
merchants, and politicians rallied their communities to support certain units, and immigrants with
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military experience and militiamen were frequently elected or chosen as officers. Commercial
organizations like the Chicago Board of Trade and Chicago’s various militias also assisted in
organizing units, and it seems that men often enlisted in these units because of their association
with these well-known institutions. Some communities also saw the war as an opportunity, as the
pro-Union militias and the Republican Wide Awakes sought to support the Lincoln
administration through their military service, and immigrant communities bolstered their
reputation by sponsoring units composed of their countrymen. It is clear, then, that communities
were a crucial determining factor when it came to which units were organized and accepted for
service, as well as in encouraging the men in a community to join particular units.
While it is evident that community affiliations must have factored into individuals’
decisions to volunteer for military service, the specific reasons that men chose to enlist and to
join units populated by others from their communities must often be inferred. It is rare to have so
straightforward an example as that of Patrick White, the prewar member of the Chicago Light
Artillery who initially promised his sister that he would stay home only to be so ashamed that he
joined an artillery battery and assisted in its organization. Nineteenth-century notions of concepts
such as honor and masculinity surely played a role in the decision to enlist, as peer pressure
meant that men who did not volunteer could be seen by those in their communities as lacking
these qualities. Once the decision to enlist was made, men could have been drawn to units in
which their communities were well-represented for a number of reasons. Military service
obviously brought with it the possibility of death, and Victorian notions of “the good death”
emphasized that soldiers should not go unburied and that families should know their loved ones’
last words.119 By enlisting in a unit with those they already knew, men increased the chances that
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their fellow soldiers would bury them or carry their last words to their families, as one is more
likely to do this for a friend than a stranger. As such, men could very well have been comforted
by serving alongside others from their community, as the presence of these friends and
acquaintances would have helped to offset the many unknowns associated with military service.
However, the sources consulted for this research do not directly mention these possibilities, and
more research would be needed in order to determine which of these factors were most
influential for community members.
In addition to shedding light on how communities shaped the mobilization process in
Chicago, this research suggests that further research should be done on mobilization in urban
areas. Many of the communities influencing mobilization in Chicago were present because
Chicago was a large city; small towns and rural counties simply do not have the same presence
of militia units, large immigrant communities, communities composed of men of the same
profession, and major commercial organizations. As such, research on mobilization in cities such
as New York and St. Louis would allow for a better understanding of how communities shape
urban mobilization, in addition to contextualizing Chicago’s mobilization within a broader
pattern. The findings of this research also indicate that the topic of Civil War soldiers’
motivations should be studied within the context of these soldiers’ communities. Civil War
soldiers are often researched as individuals, but introducing the community aspect into this field
would contribute to the debate on what factors caused men to enlist and help to explain the
importance of communities to these men. Chicago communities evidently played a pivotal role in
determining how the mobilization process evolved and was experienced, and these findings are
significant not only for Chicago and Illinois, but for the history of Civil War mobilization as a
whole.
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Appendix
The Organization of United States Volunteer Units
At the beginning of the Civil War, the United States Regular Army was comprised of less
than 20,000 officers and men. Although the Regular Army was expanded during the course of
the war, the vast majority of Union troops instead served in the United States Volunteers. Units
of U.S. Volunteers were created by the individual Union states and tendered to the federal
government for the purpose of supplementing the U.S. Regulars.
The organization of volunteer infantry units began with the organization of a company,
comprised of about one hundred men that were typically from the same county. Once enough
men assembled to form a company, they would vote to elect their officers. Companies were
commanded by a captain, who was supported by a first lieutenant, a second lieutenant, and a
number of sergeants and corporals. Organized companies would then proceed to a “place of
rendezvous,” which in the case of Illinois would be either Springfield or Chicago, in order to be
formed into regiments. A regiment was composed of ten companies and was commanded by a
colonel, who was supported by a lieutenant colonel and a major. These officers were typically
elected during the first two years of the war, but officer elections gradually became less common
in the Union Army as the war progressed, and it was possible for the state government to
intervene in the officer selection process. Once regiments were accepted into federal service,
they were grouped together into brigades, which could be composed of anywhere from two to six
regiments and were commanded by brigadier generals. Brigades were in turn grouped into
divisions, which were commanded by major generals, divisions were grouped into corps, and
corps were combined to form an army. The organization of cavalry and artillery units proceeded
similarly, although artillerymen were organized into batteries rather than companies.

